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ABSTRACT 
 
Freedom of expression as one of the fundamental rights to ensure a person’s 
self-fulfillment has been protected by the Convention and the Court for several 
decades. This right applies also to artistic expression, including satire, parody and 
caricature. These types of ridicule have been among the most popular ways of 
expressing public opinion throughout time. 
This bachelor thesis analyzes the European Court of Human Rights’ case law in 
instances of restrictions on freedom of expression in satire, parody and caricature. The 
analysis focuses on the Court’s depth of understanding and approach to the 
particularities of satirical work. 
Key words: Freedom of expression, satire, parody, caricature, restrictions on 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, purpose of freedom of expression. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The right to freedom of expression has been protected by the Convention and 
the Court for several decades. This right applies also to artistic expression, including 
satire, parody and caricature, which have been among the most common ways of 
expressing public opinion since ancient times. However, the Court has been criticized 
for its inconsistency when approaching artistic expression. This particular research 
explores the Court’s approach to interference with freedom of expression in satire, 
parody and caricature over time. 
For a comprehensive and interdisciplinary analysis this paper consists of an 
introduction, two main parts each containing four chapters, and conclusions. The 
methods used in this research are the historical method – for analyzing the historical 
development of the Court’s approach to violations of article 10 in satire, parody and 
caricature; the analytic method – for reviewing the existing jurisprudence on freedom 
of expression, the Court’s doctrine as well as the concepts of satire, parody and 
caricature; the inductive and deductive methods – for determining  the coherence, 
consistency and depth of the Court’s approach in these types of expressions. 
As its judgments cover all the member states of the Council of Europe, the 
scope of this paper is set on the Court. The first part of the paper focuses on theory 
and main concepts of freedom of expression and its limitations, the three part test 
developed by the Court, its doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the main 
characteristics and purposes of satire, parody and caricature. 
The second part is devoted to the analysis of the Court’s case law regarding 
satire, parody, caricature and aspects of artistic expressions in general. The chapters 
provide and analysis of the consistency and development of the Court’s approach as 
well as the consideration given to the particular characteristics and role of satire and 
artistic expressions. 
The findings of this paper show that the Court’s approach has not been coherent 
as it often disregards its own precedent. Out of the different levels of the purpose of 
freedom of expression, as determined in the first part of the paper, the Court 
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emphasizes most in a paraphrased way. The Court argues that a democracy calls for 
difference in opinions and should support also offensive and unfavorable expressions. 
However, the most common reason for restricting satirical expressions has been 
exactly for being considered offensive towards someone. 
The aforementioned three part test was applied to essentially all cases examined 
in this paper, nevertheless, no special regard for satire, parody and caricature was 
observed. Also the margin of appreciation has not led to different conclusions - the 
Court’s application is inconsistent and not justified substantially enough. Overall its 
approach to satire, parody and caricature is superficial and lacks depth. There are 
indications that the Court does not fully grasp the essence and aim of satirical work, 
and does not indulge in a more comprehensive analysis. This is also supported by 
several harsh dissenting opinions expressing strong opposition towards the final 
judgment. 
The Court repeatedly stresses the aspect of humor in satire. However, this 
should not be a feature that determines satire, parody or caricature, because the aim of 
these expressions is to pick at society’s failings and vices, to induce contemplation 
and change. Humor is there to help soften the reaction of the receivers of these 
expressions. 
While it is necessary to protect repressed minorities or religious groups that 
carry a historical burden, for example, the Jewish minority, from harmful expressions, 
this kind of protection should not be a default approach for any religious group, unless 
necessary. Feelings of offence alone should not be sufficient for restrictions on satire, 
parody and caricature. This, however, has not been the case with the Court, which 
seems to give special regard to all religious groups. 
Altogether, although the recognition and protection of artistic expression has 
become broader, there is a pattern of inconsistency and generalization in the Court’s 
approach to cases dealing with satirical expressions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The more the intellectual and informative environment we live in expands due 
to globalization and digitalization, the more complex it becomes. This applies to the 
legal field as well, as areas that previously did not naturally go together, are becoming 
interlinked.
1
 Fundamental human rights concepts and systems of protection were 
rapidly developed for the simple reason of moving away from the horrors of both 
World Wars. For several decades the European Court of Human Rights has performed 
judicial functions and substantially advanced its case law.
2
 Nevertheless, criticism has 
been expressed
3
 towards its consistency when approaching violations of the right to 
freedom of expression and even more – artistic expression. 
Satire, parody and caricatures have since ancient times been one of the most 
popular styles and tools of expressing public opinion.
4
 It allows for criticism through 
irony and humor, which supposedly lessens the impact – and possible offence – 
towards the discussed subject, value or phenomenon. It undoubtedly has played and 
plays today an important role in the social information space. 
For a comprehensive and successive approach to answering how the 
restrictions on freedom of expression in satire, parody and caricature have 
developed over time in the Court, this research will be consist of an introduction, 
two main parts each containing four chapters, and conclusions.  
The scope of this paper is set on the Court as its judgments cover all the 
member states of the Council of Europe, thus providing a broad amount of cases 
within a somewhat narrow topic. The most relevant and publicly debated cases will be 
analyzed in-depth, while other national and international case law will be mentioned 
for comparative purposes. Most sources used in this work will be in English, but for 
the sake of a broader perspective and availability, also some materials in German will 
be reviewed. 
                                                          
1
 Lazerow, Herbert I. Mastering Art Law. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2015, p. 3-4 
22
 Council of Europe. The Conscience of Europe. Third Millennium Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 16-
19. Accessed on: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/anni_book_chapter01_eng.pdf 
3
 Polymenopoulou, Eleni. Does One Swallow Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at the 
European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2016, p. 511–514. 
4
 Radin, Max. Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens. The American Journal of Philology 48, no. 3, 
pages 215 – 218. 
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At first, an overview of the main conceptual topics is provided, starting with the 
purposes of freedom of expression as such. Although due to the limited space this 
chapter does not provide a general overview of the historical development of freedom 
of expression, it touches upon some important historical aspects, the necessity and 
functions of this fundamental freedom. This is followed by an explanation of the 
limitations of free expression. It includes the three-part test
5
 used by the Court to 
determine the lawfulness and necessity of interference with the freedom of expression 
set out in article 10 of the Convention. Further the concept of “a margin of 
appreciation”6 will be considered in order to set out not only the way in which the 
Court limits itself, but also why that puts a responsibility on the Court to be elaborate 
when justifying the reason for interfering with a domestic court’s decision. Lastly, a 
review of the concepts of satire, parody and caricature will be provided. Different 
angles – jurisprudence, philology, philosophy and a journalistic view – will ensure a 
diverse representation as well as highlight the common. 
The second part of the research is devoted to the analysis of the Court’s case 
law regarding satire, parody, caricature and aspects of artistic expressions in general. 
Its chapters are structured in accordance with the rights, against which the Court 
weighs the right to freedom of expression or the justification for allowing restriction. 
This chapter will consist of a case analysis, where the Court’s decisions will be held 
under examination in context of consistency, development, consideration of the 
distinct characteristics and position of satire and artistic expressions. 
The current assumption in form of a hypothesis is: Restrictions on freedom of 
expression in satire, parody and caricature are mostly weighed against the right 
to private and family life. The Court’s approach and reasoning in balancing 
these rights is extensive, but incoherent. 
In order to accurately determine the answer to the given research question and 
test the hypothesis, several methods will be used. The historical method will be 
applied when analyzing the historical development of the Court’s approach to 
violations of article 10 in satire, parody and caricature. Meanwhile the analytic 
                                                          
5
 Callamard, Agnes. Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Geneva, UN HCHR Expert meeting on the links 
between articles 19 and 20 of the  ICCPR, 2008, p. 5. 
6
 Greer, Steven. The Margin Of Appreciation: Interpretation And Discretion Under The European 
Conventionon Human Rights. Council of Europe Publishing, Human Rights Files no. 17, 2000, p. 5-6 
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method will be applied when reviewing the existing jurisprudence on freedom of 
expression, the Court’s doctrine as well as the concepts of satire, parody and 
caricature. The coherence, consistency and depth of the Court’s approach and criteria 
to restrictions on freedom of expression in these types of expressions will be 
determined using the inductive and deductive methods.  
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1. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ART 
 
This chapter concerns foundations necessary for a discussion on the extent of 
freedom of expression in satire, parody and caricature. It will set out the main 
functions and purpose of this fundamental right in society. The principles and values 
on which legal tools and instruments such as the Convention, the UDHR, the ICESCR 
and others are built will be underlined. The right to freedom of expression, including 
artistic expression does not only provide the means for self-determination, but also 
performs functions necessary for development and sustainability of a society.
7
 Artistic 
expressions both reaffirm existing notions and ideas as well as challenge them.
8
 
Structuring the essential functions and purpose of the right to freedom of expression 
will reveal also the reasons for the necessity of artistic freedom. 
At the same time it is important to note that artistic rights are complex also in 
the way that they are not merely the moral rights of the creator, but on some level the 
rights of society as well. The public mostly has a moral interest in an artwork on from 
two aspects. First of all, its interest lies in the possibility for the work to have potential 
of becoming or having already become an important part of its culture. The same may 
apply to works created in response of iconic works, creations that carry references to 
cultural icons. Secondly, the innovative element of a work may be at the heart of the 
public’s interest. Such cases may be works that contain new styles or ideas that 
promote the development of the art industry or even other fields. It may as well be a 
new philosophically based idea that challenges or critiques an existing view or ideal.
9
  
Both notions correspond with the test established by Axel Srpinger AG 
examined further in this research, which sets out the method for weighing the right to 
freedom of expression against the right to respect for one’s private and family life.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976, Application No. 5493/72, para. 49 
8
 Shaheed, Farida. Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: the right to 
freedom of artistic expression and creativity. Geneva: United Nations, 2013, p. 3 
9
 Hansmann, Henry and Santilli, Marina. Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997, p. 105-10 
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1.1. The purpose of freedom of expression 
 
The most common academic debate about freedom of expression begins at 
fairly recent times – the drafting of the UDHR or the Bill of Rights and its’ First 
Amendment – and the roots tend to be forgotten, although they provide valuable 
indications about free expression and the unchanging need for it in society, especially 
a democratic one. 
Ancient scholarly writing has suggested that in Ancient Athens some early 
formation of freedom of speech existed, because in all Ancient Greece “tongues were 
wagging freely”, unrestricted speech and imparting of ones ideas and opinions were 
already valued. Nevertheless, hints exist that over the duration of time – fixed by the 
Attic comedy – a sort of censorship occurred or was imposed. To illustrate, over its 
time there were three phases for Greek comedy – the Old, the Middle and the New 
Comedy. In the first type parodies or images of people were very precise, they used to 
have such detail that publically known people were easily recognizable, even named. 
These were usually political personas. The Middle comedy did not use the names of 
these people anymore. The Old had already transformed into typology, where 
parodies and satirical depictions were ambiguous, merely showing a type of person or 
some peculiar characteristics. These changes are said to be sudden, not gradual, 
therefore it is argued that it is reasonable to assume there could have been laws and 
norms imposed to regulate speech and expression.
10
 Thus clearly, the freedom to 
create and show caricatures of public persons in order to encourage humorous 
discourse on politics and ongoings in the city-state has been important to society since 
ancient times. Artistic mediums of expression have therefore been detrimental not 
only for the sake of entertainment, but also promotion of a public dialogue. The 
restrictions on such forms of art are at least as old. 
Later, during the seventeenth century strict censorship rules were imposed in 
England, and at that time a significant pinpoint in time became John Milton’s work 
Aeropagitica, in which he proposed the following idea: 
Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be 
monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. […] 
                                                          
10
 Radin, Max. Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens. The American Journal of Philology 48, no. 3, 
pages 215 – 218 
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Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to 
conscience, above all liberties.
11
 
The last sentence is the predecessor of what can be found in article 10 of the 
Convention with the formulation “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference”12. The need for expression was already 
then interpreted as a gateway for circulation of knowledge and understanding.
13
 Thus, 
what Milton is arguing in Aeropagitica, is that opinions and factual information are 
not something to turn into a market good, both are fundamental to creation of 
knowledge and development. Knowledge drives opinions and the other way around. 
In the same work he set out one of the fundamental concepts of free expression, the 
analogy of free expression as a “marketplace of ideas”. A widely known work of later 
origin concerning this same concept was also John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty”. Both 
compare the free movement and surfacing of ideas as a vital necessity that leads to the 
truth. Similarly as in a free market where the unsuccessful projects naturally perish, 
but the best and most effective emerge, compete and prevail.
14
 In order for true or 
“qualitative” ideas to live on and be accepted, a variety needs to be present. 
Thus, a developing and healthy society needs interaction between the individuals and 
their intellectual “baggage”. The broader importance and purpose of freedom of 
expression in society is explained in brilliant structure by Thomas Emerson. 
Emerson has argued that there is a system of freedom of expression, which 
apply to any democratic society, and that there are four consecutive pillars to it – (1) 
“assuring individual self-fulfillment”; (2) “advancement of knowledge and discovery 
of truth”; (3) “providing for participation in decision-making by all member of 
society” and (4) “balancing between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus”. The 
quote of Milton also contains already two of these pillars – individual self-fulfillment 
and the idea that free expression leads to more and better knowledge and truth.
15
 First 
                                                          
11
 Coase, R. H. Advertising and Free Speech. The Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 1, 1977, page 3 
12
 Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights, article 10. Accessed on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
13
 Curtis, Michael Kent. Free speech, "the peoples darling privilege": struggles for freedom of 
expression in American history. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 2000, page 29 
14
 Ingber, Stanley. The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1984, No. 
1, 1984, p. 1-9 
15
 Emerson, Thomas I. The system of freedom of expression. New York: Vintage Books, 1971, pages 6-
7 
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of all, people truly need to express themselves. Also in Milton’s writing it was evident 
that it is hard to restrain yourself, to not share what we believe or know. 
The human truth is never objective, but nevertheless a goal to be achieved, and 
the only way to move towards it is to revise the existing knowledge or opinions and to 
challenge them. To weed out outdated facts and data, one needs to look at other sides 
of an issue, new ideas and the opinions of other people, especially those who have 
taken on an opposing view, and that can only be done through discourse – the synergy 
of the expressions of two sides is what leads to advancement of knowledge. This 
correlates with the above mentioned function of artistic expression, which is the 
challenging of existing ideas and concepts.
16
 The same applies to the particular 
subject of this paper – satire, caricature and parody, which are to be discussed to a 
greater extent at the end of the first part of this research. 
Further, in order to shape a society and its realm in accordance with who the 
people living in it actually are – and also make political decisions that shape the state 
or community – they need to be free to express themselves through all kind of 
mediums that have a political impact. These are not just speech or writing, but also 
subtle ways, such as lifestyle or being part of a sub-culture, or – creative, artistic 
statements.
17
 
Ergo, the main observations in regards to the purpose of freedom of expression 
are, first of all, that it functions to fulfill a basic intellectual and emotional human 
need. Consequently, if all individuals are allowed self-fulfillment by expression, they 
produce diversity of opinion, where the most convincing ones can survive and thrive. 
Thus, ultimately this broad “market of ideas” provides and drives two forces. 
One is democracy, where everyone has equal rights to express themselves and 
where the majorities’ ideas rule.18 The other is development in the sense that the 
debate opened by conflicting opinions, ideas or knowledge lead to further 
examinations of either a person’s own or the opponent’s views. This, in turn, either 
                                                          
16
 Shaheed, Farida. Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: the right to 
freedom of artistic expression and creativity. Geneva: United Nations, 2013, p. 3. 
17
 Ibid., 3-4 
18
Krouse, Richard W. Polyarchy & Participation: The Changing Democratic Theory of Robert Dahl. 
Polity 14, no. 3, 1982, p. 441-444 
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consolidates or corrects one’s position.19  Either way, it leads to new discoveries, 
deeper understanding and development. Thus, we need freedom of expression for 
self-realization and growth – on the individual as well as societal level. 
 
1.2. Limits of freedom of expression 
 
The problem with the previously mentioned concept of a “free marketplace of 
ideas” is that the analogy, when set in the real word, would work somewhat 
differently. And the problem, in fact, explains the necessity for a certain degree of 
limitations on this freedom. The model of this analogy is that of laissez-faire 
economics, which prescribe absolute non-interference from the government or any 
other body or instrument that is not directly involved in market affairs. What is faulty 
in this is that economists have long established – the market does actually need 
interference to “correct failures in the economic market caused by real world 
conditions”. Similarly with the right to freedom of expression, the “marketplace of 
ideas” needs a moderate, balanced amount of regulation.20 Why so? 
One of the problems lies in the assumption that free circulation of ideas 
inevitably leads to the truth. In order to form an objective train of thought that leads to 
the truth, people would need to make not only very intelligent determinations, but also 
utterly rational ones. So far throughout time societies, civilized or not, have 
unfortunately shown that human rationality is not as reliable as we would like to 
think. Stanley Ingber has argued that: 
The market model avoids this danger of officially sanctioned 
truth; it permits, however, the converse danger of the spread of false 
doctrine by allowing expression of potential falsities.
21
 
This problem is also a very current and topical issue as on domestic and 
international levels the fight against disinformation is on every agenda of security, 
international relations and other affairs in large states as well as smaller.
22, 23
 
                                                          
19
 Emerson, Thomas I. The system of freedom of expression. New York: Vintage Books, 1971, pages 6-
7 
20
Ingber, Stanley. The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1984, No. 
1, 1984, p. 1 
21
 Ibid., p. 7 
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Another problematic moment presents itself if one looks at the form or the 
“packaging” of ideas. It is possible to convey a thought or opinion in a multitude of 
different ways, some of them – very insulting, offensive, and even hateful. Many 
ideas often can carry very little meaning and value, but can have a grave impact on a 
group or individual member of society.
24
 This corresponds with yet another of today’s 
issues – the necessity to regulate hate speech (also set out in article 19 of the 
Convention) and protection of individual’s privacy and dignity.25 
Therefore, the right to freedom of expression is not absolute. Some level of 
regulation and accountability is detrimental. The Council of Europe has differentiated 
qualified rights and unqualified rights. The former means all those fundamental rights, 
which “may be interfered with in order to protect the rights of another or the wider 
public interest, e.g. the right to private and family life”26. This includes the right to 
freedom of expression. Unqualified rights are, thus, rights that cannot be balanced 
against someone else’s needs, such as the freedom from torture. 
In order not to infringe a State’s sovereignty and take into account various legal 
systems, historical aspects, specific political and economic atmosphere as well as 
cultural baggage, human rights documents, including the Convention, have only 
provided a minimum set of standards to safeguard freedom of expression.
27 As the 
focus of this research is an analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (the Court), therefore this paper focuses on the analysis of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the author will focus on the analysis of the 
approaches used in them . 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22
 Butcher, Paul. Disinformation and democracy: The home front in the information war. European 
Policy Center, Discussion Paper, 2019, p. 4 
23
 Priest, Dana. Lessons from Europe’s Fight Against Russian Disinformation. The New Yorker , 2017. 
Accessed on: https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/lessons-from-europes-fight-against-
russian-disinformation 
24
 Ingber, Stanley. The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1984, No. 
1, 1984, p. 32-35 
25
 Rauch, Jonathan. Who Will Regulate Hate Speech? Cato Unbound, A Journal of Debate, 2018. 
Accessed on: https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/06/21/jonathan-rauch/who-will-regulate-hate-speech 
26
 Council of Europe. Some definitions. Accessed on: https://www.coe.int/en/web/echr-
toolkit/definitions 
27
 Mendel, Toby. A Guide to the Interpretation and Meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Council of Europe Centre for Law and Democracy, p. 40-43. Accessed on: 
https://rm.coe.int/16806f5bb3 
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First of all, the limitations to article 10, just as for the other articles of the 
Convention, are set out in article 17. Cases where not even prima facie protection is 
granted for expressions are where the following applies: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than 
is provided for in the Convention.
28
 
This provision in relation to article 10 has been mainly used towards 
expressions undermining core values of the Convention like tolerance and non-
discrimination. For example, in Norwood v. the United Kingdom in 2004 a poster of 
the Twin Towers stating “Islam out of Britain – protect the British people” was not 
regarded as protected speech as it was attacking towards Muslims in the United 
Kingdom, therefore against the values of the Convention – tolerance, social peace and 
non-discrimination.
29
 
Besides the limitations set out in article 17, the text of article 10 itself provides 
clear indications of when it is allowed to interfere and put restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression. Respectively, the person who chooses to exercise their right to 
this freedom, “since it carries with it duties and responsibilities”, also agrees that there 
can be conditions or consequences, if it is necessary in a democratic society  for the 
protection of one of these goals - (1) in the interest of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, (2) to prevent disorder or crime, (3)  to protect the health or 
morals of society, (5) to protect the reputation or rights of others, (5) to prevent the 
disclosure of information received in confidence or (6) to maintain the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
30
  
                                                          
28
 Prohibition of Abuse of Rights. Article 17. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human 
Rights, 1950. Accessed on: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
29
 Mendel, Toby. A Guide to the Interpretation and Meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Council of Europe Centre for Law and Democracy, p. 9-11. Accessed on: 
https://rm.coe.int/16806f5bb3 
30
Freedom of Expression. Article 10. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, 
1950. Accessed on: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
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In order to determine the necessity of restrictions in a democratic society, the 
Court has developed a three part test
31
 based on the second part of article 10. 
The first part of the test is determination of whether the interference has been 
lawful.
32
  This means, there have to be domestic laws present, which are accessible 
and “formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct”.33 
Secondly, there has to be a legitimate aim
34
 for restriction. Essentially always 
this is one of the aims in the second part of article 10 or another article of the 
Convention.  
The third part of the test is determining the necessity of the restriction
35
. 
Necessary in this case means, first of all, that there is a pressing social need
36
. 
Secondly, the reasons for the restriction must be relevant and sufficient
37
, which 
means that the principle of proportionality needs to be kept in mind.
38
 Only if all 
requirements of the test are met, can an interference with the right to freedom of 
expression be considered justifiable. 
The Court itself has noted that any restrictions on freedom of expression have to 
be carried out very careful and very conclusively: “Freedom of expression … is 
subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and 
the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.”39 
 
  
                                                          
31
 Callamard, Agnes. Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Geneva, UN HCHR Expert meeting on the links 
between articles 19 and 20 of the  ICCPR, 2008, p. 5 
32
 Groppera Radio AG and others v. Switzerland, 1990. Application no. 10890/84, para. 68 
33
 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom 1979. Application No. 6538/74, para. 49 
34
 Mendel, Toby. A Guide to the Interpretation and Meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Council of Europe Centre for Law and Democracy, p. 38. Accessed on: 
https://rm.coe.int/16806f5bb3 
35
 Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 1991. Application no. 13166/87, para. 59 
36
 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom 1979. Application No. 6538/74, para 59 
37
 Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania, 2004. Application no. 33348/96, para. 90 
38
 Lingens v. Austria, 1986, Application No. 9815/82 
39
 Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 1992. Application No. 13778/88, para. 63 
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1.3. A margin of appreciation 
 
Despite numerous rules and thought-through approaches for the best ways of 
monitoring and being able to regulate free speech in the least damaging and most 
appropriate ways, the Court considers that the domestic level and its particular setting 
is best known to the domestic courts.
40
 That is why on certain topics it has given a 
“wide margin of appreciation” to the domestic courts. This doctrine means that the 
Court recognizes the fact that states can have historical, political and cultural 
differences as well as different legal systems and approaches. Because of that reason 
states may have some peculiar and distinct disparities when it comes to interpreting 
and arguing the “legitimate aims” set out in the second part of article 10.41 
This does not mean, however, that states may disregard the aims and purpose of 
the Convention. On the contrary – it demands that they should act in accordance with 
their individual situation while aligning with the Convention and other international 
human rights documents.
42
 This may in reality be even more complicated than 
“transplanting” the Convention directly and literally. 
A wider margin of appreciation is typically applied to issues that concern the 
protection of morals, including and especially religious sensitivities: 
[A] wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the 
Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation 
to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the 
sphere of morals or, especially, religion.
43
 
The same goes for commercial matters, especially in regards to unfair 
competition and other instances in which the domestic courts have a significantly 
better understanding of the internal situation than the Court.
44
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At the same time the Court has put an emphasis on the importance of free 
circulation of information, ideas and opinions that are important to society and public 
discourse: 
[T]he Court considers it essential in a democratic society that a 
debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity amounting to crimes 
against humanity should be able to take place freely.
45
 
These aspects and their importance are best understood on the domestic level. 
Therefore, this margin of appreciation also puts a certain responsibility on the Court 
to provide substantiation for determining the domestic court’s decision invalid.46 
It is necessary to note that criticism has often been expressed in regards to this 
“doctrine” as it is not present in the text of the Convention, but moreover because 
there is no “uniform or coherent application” in the case law of the Court.47, 48 An 
independent observation of this assertion will be made during the course of this 
research. Meanwhile, to analyze the problems of the given topic through an 
interdisciplinary approach, it is imperative to gain a deeper understanding of the 
particular subject matter. The next chapter will shortly look into the concepts of satire, 
parody and caricature from a legal, philological and linguistic angle. 
 
1.4. Satire, parody and caricature 
 
With satire parody and caricature one can say – similarly as about art generally 
– that it is “defined differently depending on the purpose for which it is being 
defined”.49 In case law these are mostly referred to as styles, not types of art per se. 
And truly, not always can one say that satire, parody or caricature is art. As eloquently 
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put in the German case Herr K. v. von Sachsen – “satire can be art, but not all satire is 
art”.50 
All three of these artistic expressions go hand in hand as all of them are a form 
of ridicule. From the philological point of view the main characteristic of satire is that 
it combines criticism and ironic humor, wit.
51
 
Meanwhile, parody also intends to ridicule the subject it portrays, but doing so 
by imitation. Caricature is not always visual, it can also be written. Its main 
component distinguishing in from satire and parody is that it exaggerates the qualities 
and characteristics of the subject being ridiculed. Satire is the broadest of these types 
of ridicule, and, while both parody and caricature can be satirical, they do not always 
have to be, because satire applies more to the content while caricature and parody are 
more or less the form of the work or creation.
52
  
An example of earlier works of satire is Jonathan Swift’s essay “A Modest 
Proposal” challenging the Irish system of landowning.53 The intention is to ultimately 
reach the government and to affect people’s perception of the problems mentioned in 
the writing. What, nevertheless, is not the aim of it – offending the subject of 
discussion. Offence may be merely a byproduct of the creation, but the goal is to 
challenge the subject, whether it is a person or a phenomena or even object. Similarly 
with parody and caricature – the broader goal and the core intention of such styles of 
expression is to serve as a catalyst for discussion and improvement.
54
 Humor softens 
the “blow” of the criticism, but still allows provoking emotions and social response 
that leads to either manifestation of an existing ideal or view, or towards change.
55
 
The spirit of the satiric style is to “ridicule the failing rather than the individual, 
and to limit its ridicule to corrigible faults, excluding those for which a person is not 
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responsible”.56 The target of criticism is the quality or action, or characteristic itself, 
not the subject it is attributed to. While comedy aims to provoke laughter as a goal, 
satire uses this reaction to point out what might be wrong with society. Its aim is to 
better society and to point out the flaws and characteristics in society, which the 
creator of the satirical work believes are threatening to said society.
57
 Therefore, by 
default and functionality satire comes with good intentions, even when it may seem 
that it is a directed attack towards an individual. Satire’s function is not to ridicule 
something or someone per se, but to serve as a warning regarding a pressing issue, 
and a catalyst that would promote change.
58
 That is precisely why satirical 
expressions as well as parody and caricature are detriment to a democratic society.  
Undoubtedly, this also means that satire can be used as the exact thing it by 
definition should not be – a weapon for attacking individuals or groups personally. 
This was also pointed out by journalist and novelist Will Self, who argued that 
because there is no common international view on what the “right life” and the 
“proper” set of standards is, the same type of satire will not be effective and 
purposeful in different societies. As we live in an era of a globalized information 
space, but a more or less national moral space, satire may not perform its functions, 
but instead “afflict the already afflicted”. 59  This leads to the test Self uses to 
determine whether a work truly is satiric. He poses the question – whom does the 
work in front of him comfort, and whom does it afflict?
60
 This method, as easy as it 
seems, could, quite reasonably, be a determining criteria when examining whether a 
work can be considered satire – if it does not serve its true purpose, but merely 
offends an already vulnerable group, then it may be something else disguised as 
satire. 
To summarize, satire, parody and caricature are somewhat similar as they are 
used for similar purposes. All three are types of ridicule, which – as styles – serve the 
purpose of promoting certain change or at least provoke thought and evaluation. The 
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creator of authentic satire is driven by the intention not to hurt a person or group as 
such, but to attack the underlying values or lack of them as general phenomena. The 
creator of such work does so as a reaction to events in society, which he or she deems 
questionable or unacceptable. Thus, satires’ goal is to provide that society does not 
accept morally or otherwise questionable happenings quietly and that the questionable 
action would not become a tendency, which ultimately would corrupt said society. 
The person creating a work of satirical nature deems it to be detriment to society and 
wants betterment of society. These are some of the points to take into account before 
moving on to the examination of the Court’s approach and considerations regarding 
artistic expression and satire, parody and caricature. 
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2. RESTRICTIONS ON ART IN THE CASE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Court’s case law on the restrictions on satire, parody and caricature is 
relatively extensive in numbers. The cases where satire has been mentioned by name 
date back to the 90’s while freedom of expression was deemed applicable also to 
“offensive, disturbing or shocking”61 content two decades earlier. Considering the 
quantity and time frame, it would be reasonable to expect a consistent approach and 
solid understanding of satirical work, which corresponds to the actual occupational 
and creative field in which these works are created. 
This chapter will, first of all, consider the most common issue dealt with in the 
selected cases – the possible interference with freedom of expression for the 
protection of the rights of others, specifically, their private and family life. After an 
overall review of the main principles emerging from said cases, a number of 
subchapters will consider ideas that occur repeatedly and indicate a certain degree of 
coherence. 
After the analysis of the issue covered most extensively by case law, the cases 
dealing with other reasons for interference will be covered. These are – protection of 
morals, maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, right to 
association, and right to freedom of religion. 
2.1.  Restrictions necessary for the protection of the rights of others 
 
Already in 1976 the Court defended unfavorable and shocking content for the 
sake of information pluralism and exchange of opinion and ideas
62
, even though it 
did not differentiate art from other expressions yet. What the Court had established, 
though, was that “not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, 
but also the form in which they are conveyed”, was protected by article 1063. This 
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has been true in cases where expressions have been articulated orally
64
, in print
65
 and 
leaflets
66
, via symbols
67
, films
68
, demonstrations
69
, broadcasting
70
 , paintings
71
 and 
other mediums. 
The most common reason given for possible restrictions of the right to freedom 
of expression has been where it is necessary for the protection of the rights of others. 
Consequently, there are certain criteria and tests that have emerged over the course of 
time to provide tools for weighing the rights of the parties or sides involved. 
2.1.1. Freedom of expression v. Respect for private and family life 
 
When thinking about how to balance the right of the author’s freedom of 
expression against the rights of others, who are impacted by a piece of artistic work, 
the Court has set out different principles and approaches over time. In several cases 
the Court has repeatedly referred to criteria that help properly balance the right to 
protection of privacy guaranteed in the article 8 of the Convention and the right to 
freedom of expression. 
In some of the first cases in which satire was balanced against privacy, like 
Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania
72
 and Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland
73
, both 
in 2004
74
, the three part test was applied, but the case law was still not as broad. 
Therefore a somewhat superficial reasoning can be seen.  
In Romania’s case the issue at stake was an article accompanied by a caricature 
of two public figures that were allegedly involved in a public procurement fraud 
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case.
75
 Court overlooked the argument of one of the parties pointing out that the 
national courts may not have met the threshold for “pressing social need” to justify 
interference. The party argued that, first of all, the content and topic was important to 
public debate, and, secondly, the form was in no way attacking to the claimant on a 
personal level, but a satirical writing with an obviously humorous caricature. The 
Court argued that the aim of the state to interfere with the free expression was 
legitimate, but there was a violation of article 10 only because of the disproportionate 
measures – a prison sentence for the author.  
In Finland’s case the wife of a public figure had become “collateral damage” to 
her husband’s trial, and claimed that her privacy was invaded. The broadcast in 
question was clearly identified as a satirical programme, but never inspected as such 
as the focus was set on the argument that the affected party – the wife of a public 
figure in politics – cannot expect the same level of privacy as an average person. 
Although her husband was publically known, she in fact had remained outside the 
public spotlight, but with her husband’s trial, she had already been featured in the 
news several times. This ultimately made her a public figure as well, and inevitably 
comes with the positive aspects as well as the negative ones. That was also the main 
argument for deciding that there was a violation of article 10. 
What is interesting is that in both cases the Court determined a violation without 
inspecting in depth the aspect of the satirical nature of the expression in question. It 
may be that the Court did not see these arguments as essential to the issue at stake, but 
it undermines the principle that it has the responsibility to give the domestic courts a 
wide margin of appreciation. Meaning, the Court should give an elaborate and in-
depth analysis and argumentation of all aspects when deeming a domestic court 
decision invalid. 
What more, although the facts of Finland’s case specify that the broadcast 
programme was political satire, the claimant did not use this fact for their 
argumentation. They relied solely on the fact that the affected party had been 
discussed publically before, thus, had become a public figure already. This could 
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indicate either a lack of understanding on the claimants or their attorney’s side of the 
special position and nature of satire, or a strong belief that their one argument would 
suffice to win their case. Meanwhile, in Romania’s case the claimants did in fact 
stress the satirical nature of the expression in their arguments, which the Court 
disregarded entirely. These cases were decided in 2004, making it somewhat 
understandable that a lack of elaborate and in-depth case law to rely on results on a 
superficial approach to the specifics of a particular case. 
At the same time – stare decisis provides that there has to be a first step taken 
towards the creation of such case law. On the one hand the Court is obliged to follow 
precedent, but on the other hand it is empowered to gradually evolve its case law.
76
 
The author believes that in these cases the Court failed to take this step forward, even 
more – it failed to uphold consistency where it has the material and even certain 
precedent.
77
 
A case in 2007, however, shows that the Court recognizes its past decisions for 
cases regarding artistic, satirical expressions. In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. 
Austria
78 an artist’s paintings were not allowed to be further exhibited as they 
contained collages of prominent members of society, including politicians portrayed 
in sexual poses and activities with one another. There the Court emphasized that 
“satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent 
features of exaggeration and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and 
agitate”79. It argued that such expressions are necessary for a democratic society – 
they further plurality of opinion and exchange of ideas. This in turn, has been noted in 
several other cases before, where it was emphasized that a democratic society needs 
not only favorable and inoffensive opinions and ideas, but also ones that are regarded 
as “shock, offend or disturb the State or any other sector of the population”80. 
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This reasoning goes in hand with the purpose of advancing discovery of truth
81
 by 
challenging existing social paradigms
82
. 
Later on the criteria for weighing right to freedom of expression against the 
right to respect for private life were set out in Axel Srpinger AG. 
83
  The principles 
were as follows: (1) contribution to a debate of general interest; (2) how well known 
the person concerned is; (3) the subject of the report; (4) the prior conduct of the 
person concerned; (5) the content, form and consequences of the publication. These 
criteria apply also to cases concerning satire and other artistic expression when there 
is a claim regarding interference of the privacy of public figures. Considering the 
often political nature of satirical works, this may be applicable quite often. 
In the case Bohlen v Germany84
 
, the first instances of the domestic courts ruled 
in favor of the applicant, because the primary aim of the advertisement was 
commercial gain. The Federal Court of Justice claimed that the applicant’s wish not to 
be named in the advertisement without consent carried less weight than the 
company’s right to free expression. Therefore, the Federal court did not see the need 
to even examine whether the type of expression falls under artistic expression.  
When applying the aforementioned Axel Springer criteria to this case, the Court 
recognized, first of all, that a debate of general interest did in fact exist. The 
advertisement in question referred to the applicant’s book that he had published 
recently. After publication of said book, the company created a humorous advert, 
which further brought up public debate to some extent. Because of the humorous 
execution, the Court held that it accepts this advert in the relevant context as satire, 
which is “recognized in its case law as a form of artistic expression and social 
commentary”85, referring to the above mentioned Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. 
Austria. Thus, the first criterion applied is favorable to the defendant, the creator of 
the content. 
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The second criterion in Bohlen is decisive in whether a person belongs to the 
group of public figures, people that are recognizable by the public and because of that 
may not claim the same level of privacy and, thus, protection of it, as private 
individuals may. Thirdly, the Court evaluated the content of the advertisement, which 
clearly only referred to the applicants book, the publication of which was a public 
event. The Court also stressed that the advert did not even mention those private 
details, which the applicant had revealed in said book himself. Thus, the subject of the 
debate did not overstep any boundaries of privacy. The conduct of the applicant 
indicated strongly that he himself was aiming for wider recognition through the book, 
which is why the Court argued that Bohlen himself had lowered his “legitimate 
expectations” in regards to privacy. 
Finally, the content and its form as well as the further consequences, as already 
established by the domestic courts, were not degrading to the applicant or caused any 
negative effect to his reputation. The Court held that the domestic Federal court had 
ruled correctly, regard was given to the artistic nature of expression, because of the 
humorous element. This form of expression was being recognized as a combination of 
art and discourse.  
However, a completely different approach than so far, was taken in Lindon, 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France
86
, where the dissenting opinion criticized 
that the Court had not analyzed this case by the usual criteria properly, but by 
paraphrasing the arguments of the domestic courts. The work in question was a novel, 
partly based on true events, which described the life and conduct of Jean-Marie Le 
Pen. The dissenting opinion argued that there was no proper weighing of the different 
interests and rights against each other in order to find the right balance. Nor had there 
been a coherent logic in regards to which passages were considered defamatory and 
which were not, giving the impression that special protection is given to public 
figures. 
The precedent in these kinds of cases usually provides the opposite logic – 
public figures have less expectation to privacy and shielding from public criticism. 
What was an evident difference, though, is the absence of the humor element insofar 
as can be concluded from the analysis of the Court. The dissenting opinion made a 
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harsh conclusion – the result of this case may be that European supervision is lacking, 
and the Court is taking a “significant departure from its case law in matters of 
criticism of politicians”. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether this work falls into the 
category of satire, parody and caricature and the Court has ignored this aspect, or if 
the dissenting judge has merely raised an issue not quite relevant to this case. 
Regardless of that, there is an indication that the Court is departing from its case law 
in this instance. 
This, again, indicates a disregard for the doctrine of precedent, which, as 
described by the Latin “stare decisis et non quieta movere”, makes the past judgments 
rendered by the Court, binding for it
87
 to a certain degree.
88
 If the Court decided to 
uphold the new approach, thus, creating new precedent, it would, first of all, need to 
justify such determination. The function of precedent should not merely be looked at 
from an onward going perspective. Meaning, courts should not only view past 
decisions as material to apply to today’s situation, but also, when creating precedent, 
do that while bearing in mind the possible needs of possible tomorrow’s cases.89 
Obviously, the Court did not suddenly change its approach to protection of the 
privacy of public figures, as the following cases will support.  
In a later case in Eon v. France in 2013
90
, the Court proved to be protective of 
criticism towards politicians after all. The issue at stake was a plaque held up by a 
political activist, which stated (in French) “Get lost, you sad prick”. This was aimed at 
the president who was visiting Laval at that time. The phrase referred to what the head 
of state himself had previously expressed during an agricultural show towards a 
farmer who refused to shake his hand. 
The similarity of this and the previously discussed case is mainly that both Le 
Pen as a character and the offensive phrase uttered by the president were discussed 
widely on a public level. Somewhat different, though, are the volumes of these pieces 
of “social commentary” as in the Le Pen case a whole book was written about his life 
and alleged crimes he had committed. In Eon merely one plaque with one sentence 
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was used. What one also needs to keep in mind is the reach of each expression – each 
copy of a book, which is sold, is read by at least one person. A book is also available 
for sale over years, not merely for one day. The commentary on the plaque could have 
been directly seen only by the people present at the venue during the president’s visit. 
What more, the novel was an original creation while the text on the plaque was an 
appropriation. 
In both cases the domestic courts deemed the expressions to be defamatory. The 
courts seemed to protect politically controversial characters of high status or their 
actions more extensively than a valid debate. Meanwhile the Court took a different 
stance in each case. In Eon v. France the Court did not even conduct a full three part 
test; it merely referred to existing notions in case law, and found that enough to 
determine a violation of article 10. While that seems positive from the perspective of 
the creators and “expressers”, this, again, is a shallow, superficial approach. If there is 
a test existent, it should be applied in all cases to which it is applicable.  Also, if the 
Court renders a judgment that contradicts the domestic court, the reasons need to be 
elaborate. That is the idea behind the margin of appreciation.
91
 
 Despite certain similarities, these cases differ enough for one to expect and not 
be surprised by different outcomes. This does not, however, lessen the questionability 
of the Court’s approach in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, as it 
seems to indicate that the Court undermined artistic expression for the sake of 
protecting a widely criticized high standing political figure. 
Ultimately, when thinking about the general role of courts and principles of 
adjudication, it is imperative to note two aspects of law itself - the need for legal 
certainty and the need for individual justice. For one, society needs to be certain that 
rules, their effect and outcomes are reliable, clear and easy to understand. On the 
other part, specific issues or conflicts have distinct circumstances, thus, the need to be 
evaluated separately.
92
 What has been observed so far from the European Court of 
Human Rights is that its approach, although evolving, does not provide strong 
certainty. It often seems to disregard the existing precedent, which is small as it is.  
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Furthermore, the Court does not yet give evidence that it has evolved gradually, 
but presents a pattern of fluctuating between two approaches. Either it is in-depth 
analysis and high regard for a wide outlook on the peculiarities of artistic expression 
or a general appreciation of the right to free expression without immersing itself in 
any particular aspects. What also raises some questions is the disregard of parties’ 
arguments in few instances. This goes against the principle of intelligibility.
93
 The 
lack of depth also constitutes a lack of clarity and comprehension of what the Court’s 
chain of reasoning was and why the outcome is what it is. 
Regardless of the lack of consistency and clarity, there are common elements in 
regards to the restriction of freedom of expression in satire, parody and caricature for 
the necessity to protect the private and family life of others. The main one is the 
recognition that satire as an important part of discourse has a right to be offensive to 
some extent as such content promotes plurality of information. Other than that, the 
approach does not differ much from other general cases concerning the weighing of 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to protection of privacy. 
Style and context matter 
 
When searching further for the unifying elements in the approach of the Court, a 
few cases stood out that indicated a similar pattern of ideas.  As satire was already 
recognized as expression that can naturally be offensive and agitating, the following 
cases continue this idea by arguing that the expression needs to be viewed within 
context. Also, the overall style needs to be assessed. 
In a fairly recent case in 2014 – Mladina D.D. Ljubljana v. Slovenia94 – the 
applicant claiming interference with their freedom of expression argued that the 
written piece was satirical social commentary. Nevertheless, the domestic court did 
not view these arguments or refer to case law or principles that protect artistic 
expressions, especially satire. 
The Court did not go into an in depth examination of the written work in 
question as it did in previous cases, but it relied on the three part test while bearing in 
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mind to give the domestic courts a large enough margin of appreciation. The third 
part, the determination of the necessity of such interference in a democratic society 
revealed that the restriction was not convincingly supported by a pressing social need.  
In regards to the work as an artistic piece, the Court brought forth two main 
arguments, one of which was the opinion that a work should be viewed as a whole, 
and the offending passage – within the context of the work. The second notion was 
that it is very important to take into account the overall style of an expression. It 
argued that even words or phrases that may seem vulgar or offend, have to be 
protected, when they are “serving merely stylistic purposes”95.  
In Sousa Goucha v. Portugal96, two issues were claimed to be at stake, but when 
examining satire, parody and other artistic forms of expression, article 8 and the 
protection of privacy was given most regard to by the Court. The same criteria as in 
Bohlen v Germany were taken into account, but the Court went further. It recognized, 
just as in Bohlen, that satire is indeed a form of artistic expression and social 
commentary, but it continued to argue that the characteristics of satire include 
exaggeration and distortion of reality, and that it also “naturally aims to provoke 
and agitate”97 . Therefore, it is not enough to conclude that a work that causes 
feelings of offence is prohibited expression. If it is part of an intentional, coherent 
style, it may very well be protected expression, if the intention to harm is lacking. 
In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria the Court had set the above 
mentioned idea out alongside with the notion that satirical art obviously does not aim 
to be literal and portray reality or truth in any way. Because of these reasons, the 
Court noted that it is very important to examine an artist’s right to this kind of 
expression very carefully. The line between offence and defamation as well as 
abstract, pictorial criticism can be very fine. In the instance of Sousa Goucha the 
Court agreed with the ruling of the domestic courts that it had assessed the situation 
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properly by taking into account the context – the playful style and overall consistent 
humorous nature of the TV show, also the fact that the claimant was a public figure. 
One of the differences that comes up in this case is the due regard given to the intent 
of the defendant, more precisely, lack thereof – the Court took into account that there 
was nothing indicating intent to attack the applicant’s reputation, and consequently 
noted that the joke should be viewed in way that “any reasonable spectator of the 
comedy show” would. 
The given cases indicate that the Court has given some consideration to the 
nature of satire and the importance of the setting in which it has been produced and 
communicated. What more, it has also noted that the intention of the expresser plays a 
role. Nevertheless, the explanation lacked depth and focused on the general aspects of 
freedom of expression. Thus, although recognizing certain elements of satire, it has 
not set out a specific way to identify satire and therefore has not given special 
consideration for it, merely a broad understanding that there is such type of creative 
expression. 
The reasonable person 
 
The argument of a “reasonable spectator” in Sousa Goucha (above) brings forth 
the case the Court was referring to in that incident – Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe 
News GMBH v. Austria. It is the case that set out precedent for the criterion of the 
reasonable reader specifically in regards to issues of materials of satirical nature. 
Here, the issue at stake was a journalist’s satirical article on nationally well-known 
athletes.98  In the domestic proceedings the first instance court applied the “standard 
of a hasty and unfocused reader”, which was upheld by the appellate court. They took 
the view that any reader would assume the article to have at least some factual 
background and not be entirely exaggerated fiction, which portrayed a respected 
athlete in a negative light.  The courts decided that the claimants’ personal interests 
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outweigh the artistic freedom of the author. This kind of approach shows a disregard 
towards one of the most prominent characteristics of art – its fictional nature. 
The Court, although leaving a wide margin of appreciation to the domestic 
courts, still conducted its own test to determine whether there is necessity for such 
interference in a democratic society. The third part of this test is a determining if the 
interference in question resolves a “pressing social need”. After analyzing and 
establishing whether the justification of the domestic courts was “relevant and 
sufficient”, and whether the measures taken were “proportionate to the legitimate 
aims pursued”, the Court expressed doubts about the justifications of the domestic 
courts for interfering with the author’s right to freedom of expression. 
It argued that a reasonable person would, in fact, understand the satirical 
style and fiction in the text, and even more – that there was an obvious humorous 
element in it. Although the commonality throughout many of the examined cases so 
far is the obvious a noticeable element of humor, it is not that obvious what one 
should view as apparently funny. It can be concluded from the wording of the court in 
these instances – the intent of what the artist is trying to communicate matters to a 
great extent. 
When thinking about the criterion of the reasonable reader, it is a person able to 
distinguish fact from fiction, an offensive attack from figurative, creative criticism. In 
this context some interesting ideas regarding fictionality and the extent of damage 
come to mind. In the German Constitutional Court’s case Esra from 2007 the issue at 
stake was a novel by Maxim Biller where he had described in detail the relationship 
between him and his former lover – a nationally well-known actress.  Although this 
case does not discuss satire or any of the types or styles of ridicule in art and although 
the court decided to interfere with the right to freedom of expression, it is relevant 
because of an inverted proportionality principle formulated in it. What the court 
argued was that the greater the level of fictionality in a work, the lesser the 
possible intrusion or attack on one’s privacy. The same would be true to the 
opposite – the less fictional the work as a whole is, the more it is likely to be intrusive 
to the private and family life of a person.
99,
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This principle from the German court does not occur in the cases examined in 
this research. Nevertheless, it would not always be applicable to works of satire, 
parody and caricature anyways. This approach would serve better if applied to artistic 
expressions in general. If combined with the “reasonable reader” criterion, this could 
take away the focus currently set on the person claiming moral damage and intrusion 
of privacy. Instead, this approach could balance out the evaluation by shifting some of 
this focus towards the creator’s actual intentions and message, which should matter as 
much as the interpretation by the affected party. 
Although it might seem welcome to see arguments such as the “obviousness” of 
satirical style and humor, it is a bold assumption to declare what would be obvious to 
the average reader, if the Court itself does not quite understand the core objective by 
which to identify satire. Although the outcome in Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News 
GMBH v. Austria may very well be the same, a more precise assessment would have 
been to merely weigh humor as an additional element. Instead the aim in terms of 
intention and direction should have been viewed – whether the author’s aim was to 
criticize or ridicule the specific athlete himself or the general idea of rivalry and 
nastiness of people in competition; if the author intended to cause harm to a person or 
to warn society of how ugly the aspiration for success can make people. The depth of 
consideration and argumentation should be more extensive especially in situations 
when contrasting the domestic court’s opinion. 
The work as a whole 
 
As can be observed, in Bohlen there was no real insult or criticism present, and 
in Sousa Goucha it was the lack of intent that made the comment inoffensive in the 
view of the Court. Nevertheless, even in a case where feelings of insult could be 
considered natural and reasonable, it was still regarded as not enough to justify 
restriction or punishment, as according to Grebneva and Alisimchik v. Russia
101
. 
Although most arguments were related to defense of press freedom, special regard 
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was given to the form of expression by arguing that even when parts or expressions in 
a work may sound or seem like personal attacks, the work has to be viewed and 
analyzed as a whole. 
In this case the Court concluded that the work in question – a written piece 
criticizing publically known prosecutors by using offensive slang and language and 
attributing immoral sexual behavior or attitudes to them – was, first of all, an allegory 
for their actions and responsibilities before the state, not a literal attack on their 
private lives. And, secondly, the article was part of a series of written parodies and 
caricatures contributing to discourse on matters important to the public. Thus, 
implicitly the court brought forth two new possible criteria for differentiating satirical 
expressions, parody and caricature from aimed personal attacks – recurrent works 
that can be identified as part of a series and a recognizable link between reality 
and the expression used to create the metaphor or allegory. 
Another fairly recent case, also in 2016, shows that the Court indeed may have 
been paying more attention to the specific characteristics and purposes of satire, 
caricature and parody. In Ziembiński v. Poland (no. 2)102  the Court presented an 
approach where the intent of the author’s work was at the focus of the examination 
instead of how the affected party perceived the – in this case – written work of satire. 
The reasoning was that the national court should not have forgotten to assess the 
necessity of interference within the context and the aim of the author’s work. 
The Court argued that the style of the article as a whole should have been taken 
into account, not just detached phrases, because then the satirical nature and ironic, 
sarcastic tone would have been apparent. What more, individuals participating in a 
public debate of general interest should, of course keep in mind the reputation and 
right of others, but are nevertheless allowed to exaggerate and even provoke – “a 
degree of immoderation is allowed”. A reference to Vereinigung Bildender Künstler 
v. Austria was made, and the assessment was that the author had not overstepped the 
limits of exaggeration that were allowed. 
This judgment was not unanimous, though, as the dissenting opinion of two 
judges now claimed that the phrases that were used in the piece were obviously 
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attacking, vulgar and aimed to insult, therefore not remotely within the limits of 
acceptable criticism. The translation to the English language had taken away from the 
emotional load that these words have in the original version. The judges noted that 
these explanations of Polish semantics were added to the case transcript by the 
national court, but not taken into account by the Court. Instead of examining the 
meaning of the words accompanied by the context, the Court had replaced the 
former by the latter. The Court had derogated from the national court’s findings 
without a thorough enough analysis and argumentation, according to the dissenting 
opinions. 
The first case viewed shows a higher regard for satire or, more precisely, artistic 
expressions. Rightfully, the Court has taken into account one of the purposes of 
satirical works – the aim to question characteristics, types or values, not to attack 
individuals as such. In Ziembiński v. Poland (no. 2) the Court has broadened its 
allowance in regards to offensive expressions. However, the dissenting opinions seem 
to indicate that at the same time it has done so without creating a proper framework 
for approaching these delicate situations. The dissenting judges identified language 
that indicates an attack on a person as such, which is not at all the purpose of satire. 
2.1.2. Restrictions necessary for the protection of morals  
 
Restrictions on freedom of expression may occur also due to other reasons 
besides the protection of an individual’s private life. Another less often appearing 
reason for restriction is where it is necessary for the protection of morals. On a certain 
level these justifications for restriction may seem similar as the focus is set on the 
protection of individuals. The difference lies mainly in the fact that the protection of 
morals applies to more than one person. It applies to the more intangible area of 
morals and values as such. 
A case in which the actions did not affect a specific group or group of people 
and, thus, the issue at stake was primarily the protection of morals, was the very 
controversial Sinkova v. Ukraine
103
 in 2018. First of all, it is controversial as the artist 
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claiming their right to expression to be violated did not merely receive a fine or was 
forced to remove her artwork from a public space – she received a suspended prison 
sentence and was detained for a period of time. 
The artwork in question was a performance by an artistic group at a memorial 
for soldiers who died during the Second World War who had been known for creating 
very provocative and shocking art to raise debate on controversial social matters or 
issues. The national courts considered the artistic performance equivalent to the 
desecration of a burial place, which was criminally punishable. The Court, 
interestingly enough, did recognize that the national courts had only taken into 
consideration the conduct at the burial place without looking at the performance as a 
whole, including a video and the intentions behind it. Nevertheless, it ignored this 
approach and argued that eternal flames are an ancient and long standing symbol in 
many cultures for the remembrance of the deceased or nationally important days in 
history. Therefore, the artist’s choice of expression was not proper. It notes that “there 
were many suitable opportunities for the applicant to express her views or participate 
in genuine protests” and that the message could have been expressed without breaking 
national criminal law and without insulting the veterans she claimed to defend. 
What more, the Court relies on the fact that the national courts convicted the 
artist for the act of frying eggs over the Eternal Flame, not for the performance as a 
whole, including the video. In this case there was a dissenting opinion as well – all 
arguing that the entire judgment had been flawed as it absolutely disregarded the 
context and form of the artwork, and the fact that art is allowed to offend (as could be 
observed in the previously mentioned case law as well). What more, the dissenting 
opinion noted that the majorities’ view about the reasons for the conviction was 
incorrect, based on what the facts of the case provide. 
The local police officers did not pursue the artistic group until after the 
publication of the video, although they had given them a warning upon discovering 
them during the performance. This case illustrates the problematic nature and 
importance of understanding artistic expressions, seeing as the distinction between an 
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insult, which is aimed to offend, and a peculiar style of humorous expression is very 
hard to draw. What it also clearly shows is that separating the tools, styles or mediums 
used for the creation of an artistic expression from the intent and context of the idea is 
quite dangerous. 
Similarly to the other cases examined so far, a pattern occurs – reflections on 
the meaning, extent or effect of “offence” are made quite often. However, the Court 
has not specified what it means by “offensive”. When looking at what the dictionary 
offers, two relevant options are presented.  It can refer to something that is “making 
attack”, meaning – actively aggressive. What it also can mean is “causing displeasure 
or resentment”.104 
The “offensiveness” that is referred to and allowed in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria
105
, is the second type. Merely feeling resentful, upset or annoyed should never 
be sufficient to justify restriction. Nevertheless, an actively aggressive attack – the 
first type – on someone’s moral space could be reason for interference. Here, the 
intentions of the artist come into play. 
If one looks at how expression functions, at the process within a person when 
expressing themselves, one thing is to be noted. As Milton and others have stated – a 
person needs to express themselves.
106
 The focus is on an intellectual and emotional 
process with a direction – from within the person, directed outwards.  Sometimes it is 
aimed towards a person or a group, sometimes its goal is just to be communicated to 
the unspecified “outside”. 
When the core aim is the reach and impact of a subject at the other end of the 
expression, the essence of expression is lost. Although the expresser may want to be 
understood, it is not imperative. What is detrimental to the expresser is, for one, the 
format of the expression – so that the creator knows that the idea or feeling is 
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“dressed” in the way they are experiencing it. Secondly – the shift from inside to 
outside
107,
 
108
 
Therefore, what is lost in the Court’s approach is the delicacy of the human 
experience. It is natural that people have different levels of strength and tolerance of 
criticism.
109
 Nevertheless, that should not be the responsibility of the creator of valid 
expression, unless the intention to harm another was present. 
2.2. Restrictions necessary to maintain the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary 
 
Protection of judicial authority has also been a reason for limiting the right to 
freedom of expression in satire. The judgment rendered in Prager and Oberschlick v. 
Austria in 1995
110
 shows that special regard was given to the status of judges. The 
domestic courts argued that the satirical article in question was defamatory as judges 
hold a special position in society. This gives them a higher level of responsibility and 
therefore asks for an untouched reputation. The author of the article had criticized a 
number of judges, but only one raised the issue to the court level.  
Although this case could have been argued through the angle of the necessity to 
maintain judicial authority which is also enshrined in the second part of article 10, the 
Court did not do this. Instead it viewed this case in light of protection of the personal 
rights of others. That may be due to the reason that principles and tests for 
determining the necessity to protect the personal rights of others have been 
established through a higher number of case law. These were still applicable in the 
following case, which is also one of the earlier cases within the scope of this research, 
thus, the case law was not as developed yet. Also, the protection of individual’s right 
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is at the core of the purpose of the Convention as such, possibly making it a stronger 
basis for argumentation.  
Key ideas to ensure a proper balance of free expression in a democratic society 
had been established already, however, it had not been argued often yet, whether 
satire and similar forms of artistic expressions could be considered privileged. As a 
result, the Court was not unanimous in its decision - it was in favor of protecting the 
judge’s reputation merely by five votes to four.  
The dissenting opinion argued that the court’s approach was incomplete and the 
test for determining defamation – unacceptably superficial. Assessing “malicious 
intent” by merely looking at the wording of the expression and by inspecting separate 
parts of an expression without context could not be enough to provide a proper 
balancing of rights. In order to do that, not only the impact on the affected has to be 
assessed, but also the intent and purpose of the author’s conduct. The dissenting 
opinion indicates another explanation for the Court’s approach, of which it has been 
accused in another case analyzed in this research
111
 - the paraphrasing of the domestic 
court’s arguments. As the domestic court’s approach was to argue defamation, the 
Court may have simply taken the same line of evaluation. 
The motif of the author’s intention and the expression within context is 
reoccurring, which indicates the consistent elements in the Court’s case law. 
Nevertheless, already in this somewhat early case, a dissenting opinion accuses the 
Court of a superficial analysis. 
2.3. Article 10 and the right to association 
 
Often intertwined with or set in the background of the right to freedom of 
expression other provisions and fundamental rights come forth. For example, in 
Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain112  the issue at stake was still the damaged 
reputation and honor of another person, with the difference that it happened in the 
context of employment relationships in a trade union. Thus, the Court claimed to 
examine the right to freedom of expression in light of article 11. 
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In itself the case was similar to the previously examined as there was the usual 
determination of whether the expressions remained in the limits of what was 
acceptable as criticism or would be classified as offensive and attacking. What the 
court did not take into account was the fact that this social commentary regarding an 
employer was a cartoon, and an ironic one at that. What more, the Court examined the 
expression merely in the context of labor relations, but not in light of freedom of 
assembly and association, as the dissenting opinion from four judges stated. 
They proposed that freedom of expression in the context of trade unions should 
also be approached similarly as media freedom, because „a function similar to the 
“watchdog” role of the press is performed by a trade union, which acts on behalf of 
the company’s workers to protect their occupational and employment-related 
interests”, thus, the special status extended to media should also be afforded to trade 
unions, similarly as in Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia in 2004. 
The dissenting judges also emphasized that the court did not even take notice of 
the fact that the cartoon on the cover of the trade union’s newsletter was, although 
tactless and offensive, still obviously satirical, thus, artistic material. By ignoring this, 
the Court gave an impression that it grants freedom of expression in trade unions a 
lower protection than in cases of artistic expression in general. In this case, the right 
to freedom of expression via art did not have to be weighed against other rights, but 
viewed in light or together with the right to association, in that way, possibly, creating 
a wider scope of permission. This case indicates that artistic expression today is 
viewed differently as in the cases from the 90’s. While the concepts and reasoning in 
regards to art are becoming wider and more often applied, they are also becoming 
more complex. 
2.4. Article 10 and freedom of religion 
 
On the aspect of religion, it is necessary to establish the two types of cases. 
Instances like Murphy v. Ireland or Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. 
Bulgaria regarding the refusal of broadcasting license or advertising band on religious 
radio stations establish the link between article 10 and article 9, which protects 
freedom of religion. In these cases the Court reviewed the circumstances and 
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arguments in light of article 10 only as it is the lex specialis in relation to the 
safeguards in article 9. In Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania or Ibragim Ibragimov 
andothers v. Russia the Court viewed both the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to freedom of religion in correlation of one another.
113
 These situations present 
the same safeguards applied through two separate measures. Thus, the right to 
freedom of religion in itself contains the right to freedom of expression. 
On the other hand, there is the possibility that restriction might be deemed 
necessary because of religious reasons. Thus, the second scenario is the interference 
with freedom of expression in order to protect religiously rooted rights. 
In this research previously the case Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria114 
has been mentioned. The subject matter of this case was a collection of visual art, 
where public figures had been portrayed in sexual poses, described as “grotesque and 
vulgar”115  by the dissenting opinion. The dissenting judges argued that this kind of 
expression oversteps the line of what is acceptable under article 10. Among the 
affected sides in this instance were also religious figures – among many political 
figures were also personalities such as Mother Teresa, for example. Nevertheless, the 
Court identified the work to be clearly satirical of nature and held that there was a 
violation of article 10.  
The complete opposite decision was made in the widely discussed controversial 
case of E.S. v. Austria
116
 where the claimant had uttered public commentary about the 
Prophet Muhammad
117
 calling his marital relations pedophilic. This instance is not 
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about artistic expressions. Consequently, the reasoning also does not look at this case 
as satirical expression. The outcome of this case was that the court found no violation 
of article 10. One might think this gives reason to believe that the court does 
differentiate and assume more protection for artistic expressions. 
The case Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria
118
 makes this question very hard to 
answer. Although many of the principles and arguments mentioned in this research so 
far has originated from or been based on this particular case, in the end the Court did 
hold that the domestic courts were right to interfere and seize the film in question. 
Similarly, in Wingrove v. United Kingdom
119
 the Court extended a wider margin of 
appreciation to the domestic courts, because of religious sensitivities – sexual and 
even erotic scenes portraying a sexual relationship between Jesus and Mother 
Teresa.
120
 Could this be due to the highly influential nature of cinematographic 
works? After all, protection of morality is one of the legitimate aims set out in article 
10. 
Some substantive and important arguments can also be found in cases that were 
never admitted to the Court. Such is the decision in M’Bala M’Bala v. France, 
2015.
121
 In this instance the issue at stake was the conviction of a comedian with the 
stage name “Dieudonné”.  
M’Bala M’Bala was known for his tendency to disguise political activities as 
comedy in order to direct controversial, if not scandalous public insults towards 
individuals or groups. This was especially true for insulting people of Jewish origin. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“the thing with Aisha and child sex” and “a 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? 
Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?”„ 
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At the end of one of his shows the comedian had invited a French academic, who has 
been convicted for his “negationist and revisionist opinions, mainly his denial of the 
existence of gas chambers in concentration camps”. During this part of the show he 
presented him with a make-belief prize, which was given to him by an actor playing 
the role of a Jew in a concentration camp – a person wearing striped pajamas with a 
yellow star and the writing “Jew” on them. 
After the comedian was charged under the domestic law, he submitted an 
application to the Court. In turn, it refused to admit this case by arguing that the 
conduct of the applicant had clearly been an attack on European values: 
In the Court’s view, this was not a performance which, even if 
satirical or provocative, fell within the protection of Article 10 
(freedom of expression) of the [Convention], but was in reality, in the 
circumstances of the case, a demonstration of hatred and anti-
Semitism and support for Holocaust denial. Disguised as an artistic 
production, it was in fact as dangerous as a head-on and sudden attack, 
and provided a platform for an ideology which ran counter to the 
values of the European Convention.
122
 
The Court relied on article 17 and noted that the comedian’s aim was to use the 
right to freedom of expression to undermine fundamental values and ideals of the 
Convention. It went even further by arguing that even as much as the admission of 
such case would encourage the destruction of the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention. 
What one can conclude from these instances is that religious matters have 
indeed been a sensitive topic for the Court. The reasoning being that the place of 
religion in each state has historical roots and, thus, the domestic courts should receive 
a wider margin of appreciation in regards to interference with these cases. 
Undoubtedly, in cases such as M’Bala M’Bala anyone can empathize – the expression 
on behalf of the comedian is obviously an intentional attack, meant to harm the 
morality of not only a minority group, but a scarred one at that. Nevertheless, the 
overall logic seems to also indicate that non-repressed religious groups receive 
“special treatment” where it might not be necessary. 
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Franceska Klug has argued that “freedom of expression must include the license 
to offend”123, which should be in accordance with what the Court itself has said about 
shocking content. If a reasonable person would understand the concept of satire and 
sharp, humorous criticism, then why can religious members of society not? 
Undoubtedly, it is imperative to allow them exercise their freedom to practice and 
express their religious beliefs. 
In Mariya Alekhina And Others v. Russia the scandalous group “Pussy Riot” 
attempted to performed from the altar in a church their musical piece “Punk Prayer – 
Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away”.124 Considering Russia’s political behavior and well-
known regard for human right (or lack thereof), the domestic authorities convicted 
members of this group to a prison sentence of up to two years. The Court found this 
treatment unjustified as the domestic courts argued the motivation behind the 
performance as religious hatred. However, in this instance the title of the performance 
indicated a response to political processes within the country, and there were no 
indications that there was any intentional offence towards the Orthodox Church. At 
most, it could be classified as negligent behavior because of the use of religious 
objects and symbols that are sacred for members of this religion. 
The reasoning indicates that the Court protects artistic expressions where they 
are political and where the restrictions imposed from the domestic authorities have 
been self-evidently disproportionate. However, this excludes the option for 
individuals to express criticism towards the church and religious institutions as such, 
as they are “sensitive” and may be “offended”.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research has presented both reoccurring ideas and principles, which 
indicate certain coherence in the approach of the Court, and a disregard of its own 
precedent and previous reasoning. 
The purpose of freedom of expression has different levels. On the primary, 
individual level, it is the need for self-fulfillment. It is followed by the search for truth 
and consequential development, and ultimately – the promotion of democracy and 
societal participation. At the same time moderate and carefully evaluated restrictions 
are necessary. 
Within the given cases these purposes were, although paraphrased, still 
considered. The Court has emphasized numerous times that a democratic society 
needs different opinions and ideas, even when they may be offensive or unfavorable 
to some. Nevertheless, the most frequent reason for deciding to restrict freedom of 
expression in the selected cases is precisely because the expression was deemed 
offensive towards someone. Thus, interference is justified for the protection of private 
and family life of another. 
The Court’s three part test is applied to all issues where it is necessary to 
determine whether the interference with the right to freedom of expression is 
justifiable. The test is incorporated visibly in the Court’s judgments. Nevertheless, 
there is no indication of any special regard given to satire, parody and caricature.  
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation often used by the Court has been 
rightfully criticized as its application in the analyzed cases is inconsistent and not 
justified substantially enough. 
The Court’s approach to satire, parody and caricature is superficial and not 
nuanced enough. It also indicates that deeper understanding of the particularities of 
satirical work is lacking. The Court missed the aim of the artwork in most cases, or 
did not even contemplate it. This was also indicated by several dissenting opinions, 
which expressed strong opposition and constituted almost half of the votes. 
Another reoccurring aspect is the recognition that satire is naturally offensive 
and ridicules its subjects, but this idea has not been elaborated in depth. Similarly the 
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aspect of humor was several times presented when supporting the argument that a 
work is satirical. This should not be a determining characteristic, however, as the 
main goal of satire is to aim at vices and faults is society and encourage 
contemplation, promote change. Humor is only the desirable supplement, which helps 
soften the reaction. 
When it comes to religious rights, it is necessary to protect repressed minorities 
or groups carrying historical “scars”. Nevertheless, the overall logic of the Court 
seems to provide a special regard for the protection of any religious group, where it 
may not be necessary. As long as the members of a religious group are allowed to 
practice their religion without interference, the same should apply to artistic 
expression. Feelings of offence alone should not be sufficient for restrictions on satire, 
parody and caricature. 
The case law of the Court has expanded over time. There is a pattern of 
inconsistency as the Court often disregards its precedent. The recognition and 
allowance of artistic expression has become broader, but not more specific or better 
grounded, which confirms the hypothesis. 
Continuance of this research would be desirable as the work has indicated 
numerous aspects suitable for a deeper analysis, such as the appreciation of humor or 
consideration of self-fulfillment in cases regarding freedom of expression. It would 
also ensure that the limitations of this work because of the restrictions of capacity are 
overcome. This research may be a valuable point of reference in future investigations 
of the functioning and efficiency of the Court as well as research on the aspects of 
artistic freedom. 
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